This proposal creates a conditions based framework to authorize VSP bonding.
Bonding is a mechanism made popular by Olympus that enables protocols to own their own liquidity. Bonding has proven successful in building treasuries and ensuring healthy liquidity across dexes, but suffers challenges when not properly bounded. This proposal introduces a framework for when rules and conditions for when bonding can occur. These conditions will be closely tied to the amount of liquidity supplied on DEX pairs and the health of the treasury to continue to fund further development of the Vesper platform and ecosystem.
Bonding - A mechanism enabling users to sell assets to the Vesper DAO in exchange for newly minted VSP that will be locked in a Time Capsule. Vesper DAO will maintain functionality to sell new bonds under the following specifications:
A user-iterable Goal List or mapping of (ERC20 token, target_budget, price_multiplier) which are wanted to be received into the Treasury.
mintFrom(erc20 address, amount) will mint an amount of VSP, the lesser of (target_budget, amount) * VSP_price.
User provides any amount of a user-specified ERC20 token. Token must be in the goal list.
N = tokens * token_price * price_multiplier
User receives N newly minted-and-locked VSP (up to mint window budget)
DAO treasury 0x9520… receives N newly minted VSP
DAO treasury 0x9520… receives collateral tokens from user
target_budget starts at maximum amount, and subtracted against the amount received from user
price_multiplier is used to add a bonus or subtract a fee
I agree in principle with protocol-owned liquidity, but doesnt this entail the removal of the supply hardcap on VSP?
What conditions would suspend bonding?
Bonding is suspended when the Goal List is met.
Goal List = “1,000,000 DAI”
Once 1M DAI is reached, bonding is disabled.
What would be the benefits and drawbacks of such a system vs buying vsp on the open market? There would need to be an incentive to mint.Presumably an increased percentage of vsp when demand is low and decreased percentage when demand is high.
Given current low demand would this decrease liquidity on dex even further?
I don’t like that this “goal list” is at the discretion of the treasury/core team. This could result in massive inflation whenever the core team deems necessary. We would need a balance of powers on this function. Right now I’m against this VIP until these concerns are resolved.
The Goal List is approved by governance and community.
One of the first assets for the Goal List would be a DEX liquidity pair, such as SLP-VSP-WETH.
This VIP brings assets into DAO treasury, which backs each new VSP minted.
That’s good👍 okay well if we’re doing it that way I’m for it.
If one of Vesper’s design purposes is to offer a safe product that is palatable to the wealth 1.0 community, might it not be prudent to stick with a tried and trusted framework?
Just as the prospects of losing principle with a withdrawal fee made vesper a non-starter for some, could mere rumours of an OHM style mechanism tarnish this conservative and safe reputation?
I see vesper as a spot where old money can start to dip their toe into the water and then stay for a while, so we might consider avoiding the appearance of anything that looks like a shark fin in the water or any danger that cant be understood from a finance 1.0 point of view.
Yes/no can bonding result in a situation where the 10 million hardcap is exceeded.
@mike6099 yes - bonding would involve distributing newly minted VSP (in the form of locked VSP positions) in exchange for treasury assets. However, this VIP does not enable minting or change the VSP hard cap. That will require a future VIP / vote.